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‘The most difficult financial matter that has ever presented itself’: 
Paper money and the financing of warfare under Louis XIV. 
 
Joël Félix 
University of Reading 
 
Based on an extensive survey of French primary sources and a discussion of the recent 
literature on fiscal policy in France and Europe during Louis XIV’s wars, this article revisits the 
rationale behind the first experiment with paper money undertaken by finance minister 
Michel Chamillart, comparing it to other belligerents’ strategies, in particular England’s, to 
adjust their monetary regime to the challenges of funding long wars of attrition. The article 
shows how concerns about economic activity, coinage, and the need to finance the war deficit 
led to a series of debasements of the French currency, the establishment of a bank in the form 
of a Caisse des emprunts and the introduction of mint bills, which became legal tender and 
caused the first experience of fiat money inflation in history. Whereas Chamillart’s personal 
shortcomings have been recently suggested as the cause of Louis XIV’s humbling in the War 
of the Spanish Succession, we argue on the contrary that the introduction of paper money in 
1704 was key to the capacity of France to sustain its military effort, but that a succession of 
military defeats against a more powerful coalition led to inflation. We also argue that the 
introduction of paper money saved the Caisse des emprunts and its bonds which helped 
sustain the war effort up until the peace. By situating the use of paper money within the 
broader question of the exercise of power in the absolute monarchy, this article examines the 
formation of fiscal policy, paying attention to the ways in which government sought advice 
from experts. It concludes by calling for further studies on policy- and decision-making under 
Louis XIV. 
Keywords: Paper money, monetary policy, fiscal crises, absolutism, Chamillart (Michel), 
Desmaretz (Nicolas), Law (John). Louis XIV’s wars. 
JEL codes; E42, E65, G14, G21, H12, H63, H81 N24, N43 
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The history of paper money in France is usually associated with the figure of John Law who, 
with the support of the Regent, Philippe, duc d’Orléans, between 1716 and 1720, carried out 
financial experiments to sustain the French currency on the international money market, 
boost economic activity and restructure the war debt accumulated in the course of Louis XIV’s 
wars. However, as John Law acknowledged, France had already used paper money, and the 
dire memory of this earlier monetary experience featured high among the arguments of 
those, in government, who initially opposed the Scot’s proposal to establish a bank and issue 
notes. ‘The public’, John Law observed in December 1715, ‘is against the bank because of the 
billets de monnoye [mint bills], of the caisse des emprunts, etc., which have brought great 
prejudice to commerce and individuals’ (Harsin 1934, II, p. 274).  
That first introduction of fiat money in the kingdom took place on the initiative of Michel 
Chamillart (1652-1721) who held both the posts of contrôleur général des finances (1699-
1708) and secrétaire d’État de la guerre (1701-1709). The decision to issue paper money as 
legal tender is certainly Chamillart’s most original and dramatic (if largely forgotten) 
contribution to the history of France, as it led to the first experience of fiat money inflation. 
Not surprisingly, this experiment has not gone unnoticed by fiscal historians (Boislisle, 1899, 
Seligman 1925, Harsin 1933, Lüthy 1959, Dessert 1984, Thiveaud 1995). Yet, due to the 
complexity of money matters, and the language hurdle, this body of literature remains largely 
inaccessible to non-French specialists. Moreover, in a recent important Anglophone study of 
Louis XIV’s finance, Rowlands (2012) pointed out that this scholarship engaged with only some 
aspects of the paper money experience. To an extent, this is also true of the latter’s more 
comprehensive work and Bonney’s earlier contribution (2001): for the question of the origins, 
development and impact of paper money is part and parcel of the broader problem of war 
finance in Europe in the last 25 years of Louis XIV’s reign.  
The period under investigation here was dominated by two major conflicts, the Nine Years’ 
War (1688-1697) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714), in which most Western 
European states united against Bourbon power. Funding these two long international 
conflicts put formidable pressures on the resources of all the belligerents. The supply of 
troops deployed in foreign territories and support to allies generated monetary problems 
which have been impressively| discussed by Jones (1988) and Graham (2015) in the case of 
England, Brandon (2015) for the Netherlands and by Rowlands (2012, 2014) for France. 
Despite Rowlands’ superb effort to identify the shortcomings of French monetary policy, in 
particular its impact on the external value of the French currency and the capacity to sustain 
the war effort, yet more work on money and credit in the age of Louis XIV is needed to catch 
up with the substantial and expanding body of literature on the English fiscal and monetary 
experience in the Age of the Financial Revolution.  
Indeed, no single study can encompass the unusually large body of primary sources available 
to the historian, including serial data on the evolution of the French money stock, about the 
financing of war under the Sun King. In this respect, Boislisle’s massive edition of the 
correspondence of Louis XIV’s finance ministers  can be misleading as it covers a small portion 
of the existing material: recently, Stoll (2008) went so far as to suggest that it might be best 
to burn this work. While Boislisle (1874-1897) did a rather good job in selecting some of the 
key documents, he could not publish the many letters and memoranda sent by leading 
experts to Chamillart, or to his advisors, let alone his autograph annotations. Yet the reading 
of these documents, of which some are undated and dispersed, is essential to appreciate both 
3 
 
3 
 
the role of individuals and institutional constraints in the formation of fiscal policy. In this 
respect, we believe that Rowlands’ work on Louis XIV’s fiscal policy is wrong in his assessment 
of Chamillart’s abilities and alleged blindness to the evil advice of corrupt advisors and 
dishonest bankers. If it seems unlikely that Chamillart will ever be seen as a great minister by 
historians, his published and manuscript notes show that he was deeply aware of the 
shortcoming of Louis XIV’s fiscal system and, for this very reason, sought to exercise firmer 
control over the financial community (Félix 2015) and introduce fiscal reforms. Yet, as we will 
argue, his aims and achievements were severely hampered by domestic politics and the 
external pressures of international warfare.  
All the warring countries of the period were confronted by the challenge of funding the 
outcome of decades of military change which had finally brought about a Military Revolution 
in warfare on land and sea (Black 1995). None of the polities involved had a roadmap to 
address this challenge: solutions had to be devised piecemeal and revisited as the fortunes of 
war altered the parameters of fiscal policy. In England, the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and 
the ensuing financial revolution were the most visible responses to the challenges posed by 
Louis XIV’s ambition, and several scholars (Dickson 1967, Wennerlind 2011, Desan 2014) have 
shown how these led to a new monetary constitution which successfully addressed what 
Bernholtz (2003) has called the ‘inflationary bias of monetary regime’ to fund wartime deficit. 
Yet not all problems were solved: for example, Kleer (2015) has identified limits to the 
capacity of the Treasury and the Bank of England to circulate credit instruments in the form 
of exchequer bills.  
On the face of things, meanwhile, the French political system – the so-called absolute 
monarchy – went essentially unreformed. But new men came to power and the context, both 
at home and abroad, did change (Collins 2009). Notwithstanding the introduction of new 
taxes (McCollim 2012), the earlier quote from John Law reminds us that various credit and 
monetary experiences took place simultaneously and consecutively during the War of the 
Spanish Succession. For Louis XIV’s ministers were well aware of the need to adjust its 
monetary regime to international challenges. As the famous banker Jean-Henri Huguetan told 
Marlborough, Louis XIV accepted the will of Charles II of Spain in favour of his grandson, 
leading to the War of the Spanish Succession, partly because he was confident that the French 
stock of money was large enough to sustain a new conflict1. On the central problem of credit 
and the nature of money, Versailles was observing new developments abroad through 
contacts with financiers and international bankers, in particular over the question of what 
would later be called chartalism, i.e. the power of the ruler to issue money and sustain public 
confidence in its value2. Not surprisingly, Louis XIV favoured royal intervention in preference 
to the market and tampered with French currency: between 1689 and 1726, France 
experienced a period of monetary instability, with 79 changes in the nominal value of the livre 
tournois (lt.), the French money of account (see figure 1).  
It is against this background of devaluations and revaluations, of French institutional tradition 
and alternative models in the Netherlands and England, and the need to fund warfare, that 
Chamillart’s contribution to fiscal policy and its impact must be assessed. Accordingly, this 
article will first analyse the decision in 1689 to alter the nominal value of the coinage and 
describe how a new technique, called réformation monétaire, facilitated the first in a series 
of five debasements between 1689 and 1709. It will then show how difficulties facing France 
when Chamillart took the finance portfolio in 1699 initiated new thinking about the fiscal 
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system, and examine how the need to fund the new war led to the re-establishment of Jean-
Baptiste Colbert’s Caisse des Emprunts (CdE) as well as a third debasement, associated this 
time with the circulation of mint bills (1701). We will then engage with the fourth debasement 
(1704), looking at the causes for its failure and examining how the ensuing credit crunch was 
successfully addressed by a new issue of mint bills which became fiat money. In the final 
section, the article will focus on the depreciation of bills against specie from 1706, paying 
attention to the impact of military defeats and the ways in which Chamillart’s and his 
successor Desmaretz’s successive policies were designed to tackle inflation while relying on 
the resource of monetary instruments to finance war deficit. The conclusion will revisit the 
question of Chamillart’s reputation and effectiveness by examining the institutional 
dimension of fiscal policy and decision-making in the absolute monarchy.  
I 
There was a relatively complex rationale behind the French government’s decision in 1689 to 
alter the value of the livre tournois. The private papers of Claude Le Peletier, who succeeded 
Colbert in 1683 as contrôleur général des finances, contain eighteen memoranda expressing 
various concerns about the monetary situation.3 These documents show that from the mid-
1680s a number of financial advisors challenged the long-established principle that the 
monarch should never alter currency. The main reason for this change of approach was the 
alleged scarcity of money which these advisors attributed to an aggressive international 
environment where merchants and polities competed for bullion. Louis XIV’s attempts to 
eradicate Protestantism in France also contributed to the economic malaise and the general 
feeling that the monetary stock was severely depleted. In the aftermath of the Revocation of 
the Edict of Nantes (1685), prominent Huguenot actors in the economic and financial sectors 
chose to emigrate and transferred their assets abroad.  
In practice, knowledge about the actual French stock of money was lacking. After some 
discussions in the King’s Council, Le Peletier came to the conclusion that the kingdom, on the 
basis of annual peacetime royal revenue of 110 million lt., had probably no more than 200 
million worth of coins, and even less according to pessimists. The financiers disagreed: 
Louville, for instance, argued that the country was still very rich, that Colbert had estimated 
the money stock to be over 500 million and that it was still at least 400 million (Lecestre 1895, 
pp. 132-3). And he was right: as we will see, the first debasement (1689-1693) brought to the 
mints no less than 465 million worth of coins. According to a recent estimate, the French 
monetary stock may have been in excess of 600 million lt., or ca. £36 million (Jambu, 2015, p. 
61). As a point of comparison, in 1696 the English recoinage worked £6.5 million worth of 
clipped silver coins out of a stock estimated at over £9 million, or ca. 150 million lt.) (Li, 1940, 
pp. 256-7].  
The absence of accurate and credible information about the coinage was a major stumbling 
block for planning economic and fiscal policy, let alone a war. As international tensions grew 
in the late 1680s, concerns about the stock of money became a burning priority: if Le Peletier’s 
evaluation was correct, it was difficult to see how France could sustain a major war against 
Europe without having to offer a high premium on its loans and draining the country of its 
metal reserves to pay the royal troops stationed abroad. When the Nine Years’ War broke out 
the government was forced to address the issue. Three royal decisions were announced in 
December 1689. A declaration restricted the amount of silver tableware that individuals, 
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including the king himself.4 Simultaneously, could keep at home. A royal edict ordered the 
excess silverware to be brought to local mints where the metal would be melted and handed 
back in newly minted coins. The king completed the new legislation by ordering all coins 
produced since the 1640s to be sent to the mints where they would be déformées (altered) 
and réformées (refashioned). This decision initiated the first in a series of four major 
restampings of the French coinage which, under Chamillart, would make the introduction of 
paper money both a possibility and, under special circumstances, a necessity.  
The advantages of a restamping of the coinage (réformation monétaire) are probably best 
explained by describing what happened to the coins at the mints. First, the gold and silver 
coins were checked (to get rid of false ones), counted, and their face value in livres tournois, 
which was fixed by royal decree, calculated. Since the production of coins took time and the 
government was unable to immediately exchange new coins for old ones, a receipt was 
normally delivered to the owners of the coins. Then the coins to be restamped were passed 
over to workers who used a new technique, invented by a sieur Castaing, whereby the stamp 
on both sides of the coin would be suppressed and the clean flan made ready to receive a 
new stamp. The new technology, however, was not available to all the mints: most of the 
coins were simply struck again, i.e. they received a new stamp on top of the existing ones, 
which sometimes obscured the details, especially after successive restampings of the coinage, 
and facilitated fraud. Use of the old coins was prohibited henceforth, but they were still 
accepted at the mints - at a lower price - thus creating the ideal condition for Gresham’s law 
to operate. In short, the restamping - or overstamping - altered the surface appearance of the 
coins but, crucially, it did not affect their intrinsic properties, in particular their content in 
precious metal.  
The restamping of the coinage was essentially a new method of debasement of the currency. 
In contrast to the traditional debasements by reminting or recoinage, a restamping presented 
various advantages. It could be done without melting the old coins, a costly operation, and 
assaying the new ones, usually a protracted business. A restamping was also a tax in kind 
(seigniorage) levied on the monetary stock. For it was always linked to an augmentation des 
monnaies, i.e. an increase in the nominal value of the coins. In other words, the owner of 
coins would receive back from the mint the same value in livres tournois but in a smaller 
number of coins of nominally higher value. The benefits of the operation were, moreover, 
immediately forthcoming. In 1689, for instance, the king kept one out of every coins restaped. 
At the beginning of a war, a restamping was considered an ideal method of raising cash 
swiftly, thus allowing the state to deploy impressive military forces to deter enemies. A 
restamping facilitated intervention on the domestic money market: it was usually associated 
with incentives for hoarders to invest their savings in new royal loans or offices marketed by 
the king’s financiers, with the capital stipulated in livres tournois (money of account) payable 
in new coins of the same metallic worth but higher nominal value. Pressure on the public to 
empty their coffers was maintained by announcements of future diminutions, i.e. reductions 
in the purchasing power of coins, which, for the investors, would result in a plus-value on 
capital. Eventually, when the coins were restored to their initial value, the whole operation 
could be started over again.  
In total, five debasements took place under Louis XIV, four by the method of restamping 
(1689, 1693, 1701 and 1704), and one by reminting (1709). Of course, these operations had 
side effects. The stock of coins and the velocity of money were affected because many tried 
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to evade the king’s tax. Debasements impacted directly on the domestic economy via the 
foreign exchange, which added to the disturbances caused by war. The co-existence of gold 
and silver coins of different nominal values but with identical metallic content offered 
opportunities for fraud (Lüthy 1959, Lévy 1969, Rowlands 2014). The pros and cons of French 
monetary policy generated intense debates throughout Louis XIV’s reign and during the 
Regency, especially after John Law’s manipulations of the currencies in support of his famous 
System (1719-1720). These discussions usually mentioned the monetary policy of Nicolas 
Desmaretz, Louis XIV’s last finance minister (1708-15), who ordered a massive devaluation of 
the French currency in 1709, and the impact of his decision to restore the livre tournois to its 
intrinsic value through a series of 13 revaluations in 1714. But commentators showed no 
interest at all in the four debasements ordered respectively by Pontchartrain in 1689 and 
1693, and then by Chamillart in 1701 and 1704. This is all the more surprising: figure 1 shows 
that Chamillart’s tenure in office was the most agitated period in French monetary history 
before John Law’s experiment and, of course, the introduction of assignats during the French 
Revolution.  
Place figure 1 about here 
 
II 
One of Chamillart’s first decisions when appointed contrôleur général des finances was to 
audit the royal treasury. Although on paper Louis XIV won the Nine Years’ War, the kingdom 
had been struggling since the great famine of 1693-4, which killed 10 per cent of the French 
population (Lachiver 1991). The return of peace in 1697 failed to bring swift economic growth. 
The impact of monetary policy, change in the geography of international trade and the 
introduction of new tariffs conspired against French recovery. Merchants complained about 
the obstacles to trade caused by the multiplicity of new indirect taxes and internal barriers 
introduced during the conflict. Also, the harvests were poor and corn had to be imported. The 
financial situation was not good either: on 6 September 1699, Chamillart established that the 
deficit for that year would reach 53 million, about half of the gross annual revenue (Esnault 
1883).  
Although documents about the new minister’s early years in office are sparse, evidence 
suggest that novel ideas were being examined. The creation of a Conseil Royal du Commerce 
(1700) was an original way of responding to the concerns of merchants and bankers, and of 
involving these experts in policy making (Schaeper 1983). On the financial front, Chamillart’s 
personal hostility to the traitants d’affaires extraordinaires, i.e. the financiers who sold royal 
offices on the king’s behalf, meant that the minister was open to alternative methods for 
raising cheaper credit (Doyle 1997, Félix 2015). Chamillart was interested in a proposal, 
inspired by the Amsterdam credit market, to issue rentes mobilières, or bearer notes, that 
could be traded more easily than the illiquid rentes perpétuelles (royal perpetual loans) 
(Béguin 2012). A proposal to establish a bank in Paris, modelled on the Bank of England, was 
the subject of serious discussions in 1701/02 that involved Madame de Maintenon, Louis XIV’s 
morganatic wife, and perhaps John Law himself (Harsin 1933).  
Foreign gazettes reported the progress of these discussions in Versailles and signalled the 
opposition from influential individuals, such as Harlay, first president of the Parlement de 
7 
 
7 
 
Paris (Chamillart 1884, 1, pp. 93-100). The backing of the bank project by several bankers and 
merchants was insufficient to overcome the hostility of the administrative and judicial elite 
whose portfolio was mostly in rentes. Chamillart probably gave up on innovations as the death 
of Charles II of Spain (1700) led Europe towards the War of the Spanish Succession. From that 
moment, the finance minister, now also secretary of state for war, had to concentrate on 
preparing the military campaign. In need of some support, he created two new posts of 
directeurs des finances, one of which was given to Nicolas Desmaretz (1648-1721). Trained by 
Colbert himself, who was his uncle, Desmaretz had lived in semi-exile for bribery since 1684 
but was consulted by the king’s ministers who regarded him as one of the best experts. 
Recalled to public office, he became one of Chamillart’s main advisors on fiscal and monetary 
policy, and took over from him the finance portfolio in 1708, which he kept until Louis XIV’s 
death (McCollim, 2012).  
Projects in favour of banks and paper money continued to reach Chamillart’s desk. On one, a 
secretary seems to have summarized the content of the minister’s oral answer: ‘No. Especially 
since the establishment of the Caisse des Emprunts’.5 Arguably, the various bank proposals 
were abandoned in favour of the creation of the Caisse des Emprunts (CdE), which John Law, 
as the reader will remember, mentioned among the reasons for the rejection of his bank 
project in 1715. As there was indeed a link between the CdE, the operations on the coinage 
and the issuing of paper money, it is necessary to say a few words about this establishment. 
Its origins can be traced back to the mid-17th century when the government leased out the 
collection of the salt tax (gabelles) to a powerful company of tax farmers (fermiers généraux) 
(Dessert 2012). To pay cash advances to the king, the tax farmers raised money by selling 
bearer bonds known as promesses des gabelles.  
In the course of the Dutch War (1672-1678), Colbert decided to build upon this private system 
of credit and, as it were, ‘nationalised’ the CdE by conferring a royal guarantee (1674) 
(Antonetti 1985). This arrangement was meant to attract the savings of individuals and 
communities who, on moral or legal grounds, would not lend money to the financiers or could 
not freeze their capital. Colbert’s immediate successor, who feared a rush on the CdE, decided 
to reimburse all the promesses (1683-4) which were converted into long-term loans. The 
management of the CdE was returned to the tax farmers until 1702, when Chamillart decided 
to guarantee again the promesses des gabelles, to which was now attached an interest of 8 
per cent, a substantial increase which says a lot about the growing difficulties France had been 
experiencing since Colbert’s death. 
As shown in figure 2, the beginning of the CdE was rather modest, and this despite 
Chamillart’s demands on each individual tax farmer to buy promesses. In August 1702, money 
started to flow in: 1,820 bonds (promesses) were sold, more than the total issued in the first 
five months of its existence. The first payment of interest probably reassured potential 
lenders. At this date, the balance sheet showed a surplus worth 4.3 million lt. By December, 
the turnover reached 30 million lt., a sum equivalent to the annual revenue of the English 
land tax or the combined product of the English excise and customs. Part of the sums collected 
was immediately used to fund war expenditure. A note dated 26 May 1703 calculated that 
Chamillart had assigned 4.7 million on the CdE since January. The trésorier général de 
l’extraordinaire des guerres and the trésorier général de la marine obtained 1.8 and 1.2 million 
respectively. In third position came Samuel Bernard (1651-1739) who was assigned 464,225 
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lt. As Europe’s single most powerful banker, he came to dominate French remittances 
between 1703 and 1708 and, as such, one of Chamillart’s main advisors.6  
Place figure 2 about here 
Various reasons may explain why the CdE was preferred to the bank projects. Apart from its 
past services, the capacity of this institution to avoid runs was regarded as a substantial 
advantage which suited the French money market. Like any credit institution the CdE faced 
the possibility of a liquidity crisis, especially as its deposits were destined for military 
expenditure. Like a bank, the CdE could respond to credit crunch by raising the interest rate 
on its bonds or calling upon the tax farmers (acting as de facto shareholders). Yet the French 
credit institution had several weaknesses. Unlike a bank, the CdE did not have any 
independent revenue other than the product of taxes already assigned. Since its bonds were 
cashable every six months the cashier could plan cash flows in advance but this short-term 
maturity constantly exposed the CdE to the problem of preference for liquidity. In this 
respect, the CdE’s success meant that the movement of money was substantial. A note about 
the situation of the CdE sent to Chamillart on 24 September 1703 – he received a cashier’s 
report every evening – calculated that 14.6 million worth of bonds were to reach maturity in 
the near future: 2.1 million in the last days of September, 5.2 million in October, 3.4 million 
in November and 3.8 million in December. Given that a year of war cost about 100 million, 
these sums were not huge but remained significant, especially as the bonds were payable 
only in Paris.  
At the end of September 1703, the total of the sums brought to the CdE since its inception 
was 51 million and its expenditure 50.6 million. The initial surplus had rapidly shrunk to under 
half a million (480,522 lt.). On 13 October 1703, for the first time, the balance sheet was 
negative. Five days later, Chamillart asked Desmaretz to report on the situation and ways to 
sustain the CdE: ‘I am starting, Sir, to be scared of what I see concerning the Caisse des 
emprunts; its situation gets worse from day to day and I apprehend that in the end the well 
might dry out’.7 Desmaretz’s answer was somewhat reassuring: he explained that current 
circumstances, in particular the renewal of all the tax farmers’ leases, had squeezed the CdE 
as the new financiers were cashing promesses to pay their advances to the royal treasury. 
Desmaretz also pointed out that the public expected a new restamping, and so were hoarding 
money until they could find a valuable investment.8 The tax farmers remained confident that 
the promesses would sell again in November and that the crisis would be over soon, provided 
the CdE continued to pay regularly. The prediction proved only half-true as the volume of 
bonds sold by the CdE did not pick up. The daily balance sheets that have survived show that 
more money was paid out each day than brought in, and the leakage continued until February 
1704. The accumulation of negative balances was a worry but the authorities did not panic. 
On a daily basis, the lack of funds was relatively small (for instance 43,744 lt. on 26 November 
1703). Payments were met by transfers of coins from the cashier of the tax farms, whose 
coffers were located in the same building. To ease the pressure, potential new lenders were 
identified by Desmaretz, in particular foreigners who were offered special facilities and 
guarantees.9  
It was in this anxious context that Chamillart, on 25 September 1703, published an arrêt du 
Conseil (royal order) stipulating that the CdE would accept billets de monnaie until the end of 
the year. These bills had been circulating for two years, after a new and third restamping 
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(September 1701). Like the two previous operations, its purpose was to fund the new war, 
which witnessed the reconstitution of the Great Alliance, minus Spain. But there was a hurdle: 
the time needed for restamping the monetary stock was likely to slow the expected benefits 
of the operation. Previously, in order to make the transition as smooth as possible, the 
government had used various techniques which were not fully satisfactory, including the 
authorisation of both old and new coins for a certain period. This time, Chamillart decided 
that the receipts traditionally delivered in exchange for the coins brought to the mints would 
be issued in the form of payments. In other words, the delay between reception of old coins 
and delivery of new ones formed the basis of a temporary credit through the circulation of 
the receipts, the so-called billets de monnaie, or mint bills. This development opened the 
possibility of issuing more bills than coins actually received, or circulate paper money, as the 
Bank of Amsterdam did with its receipts for cash deposits (Gillard 2004).  
It is not clear whether Chamillart expected to use the mint bills to simply anticipate the 
benefits of the 1701 restamping or to increase the means of payments. There was certainly 
pressure on him to act in this way. On 5 October 1701, a certain Fabre, probably Joseph Favre, 
an important merchant and financier in Marseilles who had been appointed councillor to the 
Conseil Royal de Commerce, wrote the following letter to Chamillart: 
‘As you gave me permission to tell you my feelings on facts that I believe to be 
important, I must represent to Your Highness that I see a general lack of confidence 
[discrédit] in Paris that makes all people suffer a lot. The bad situation of the time is 
the cause of all these… until the increase of the coins has produced its effect. And 
many people lock up their money for the fear they have of investing it badly […] And 
as I see that the mint bills are as well received as coins, I would believe it an absolute 
necessity to remedy the present evils, that Your Highness condescend to provide for 
the king, via the directeur and contrôleur de la monnaie, 3 or 4 million livres tournois 
in bills of large and small sums, as down payment and by way of advance on the profit 
His Majesty will derive from this increase […] This would produce an even greater 
effect than if you spread coins amongst the public […].10  
A comment on this letter, which is not in Chamillart’s handwriting but may have been dictated 
by him, rejected the suggestion forcefully; ’I thank him for his advice and he can be assured 
that I will not use it, that I have even given very pressing orders to satisfy the public with great 
diligence. This is the only means to re-establish and preserve credit’.  
Chamillart’s decision to attach an interest to the mint bills would suggest that the minister, at 
that time, did not consider the mints’ receipts as a substitute for money but simply an 
incentive for people to bring their cash to the mints speedily. Nevertheless, the government 
soon printed more mint bills than coins received. On 1 May 1702 the bills delivered by the 
Paris mint exceeded net seigniorage by 1 million lt. One year later, on 1 July 1703, the shortfall 
had risen to 2.3 million lt.  
Several mint bills of the earliest issue have survived. They were printed with blank spaces to 
be filled in. One reads as follows: 
Slip 
For the sum of nineteen hundred twenty six Livres  
fourteen sols                     that I shall pay in 
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-------------- to the bearer, value received from Mr LeLong  
                                          In coins to be restamped 
Done at the Hostel de la Monoye in Paris, the 22 September 1701 
Euldes(signed) 
On the back, the billet said: 
 
Registered at the Controlle de la Monoye, for the sum of  
nineteen hundred twenty six livres fourteen sols  
by Us Conseiller du Roy, Controlleur Contregarde of  
the said Monoye in Paris, the 22 September 1701. 
Boula (signed). 
 
A handwritten note on this bill shows that it changed hands rapidly. On 3 October, it was 
already in the possession of the Hogguer brothers, key contractors and remitters for the king, 
who endorsed it to Le Couteulx, one of the largest banking houses in Rouen. 
In the first semester of 1703 the volume of outstanding mint bills remained relatively stable 
at around 2.5 million lt., with a tendency to rise. Signed by Euldes, director of the Paris mint, 
on Chamillart’s orders, the bills were delivered to the bankers and financiers in charge of 
paying the troops. In May 1703, Bernard had received 1.1 million worth of notes. In July, the 
volume of bills suddenly increased and by December it had almost tripled to 6.7 million. This 
was a relatively small sum, represented by only nine thousand bills, for the outstanding bills 
had been issued in large denominations. As time went by, however, Euldes accepted requests 
from holders to have their bills cut, a move which did not please Chamillart. By the end of 
1703, two thirds of the outstanding bills (6,050) were for 500 lt. or under. Almost half of these 
notes were worth only 150 lt. (or less), a sum equivalent to the annual revenue of a peasant 
family. In other words, both the volume of mint bills and their velocity had increased in the 
last half of 1703.  
Although the operation looked like a success, Chamillart decided to terminate this first 
experiment with paper money. Following the announcement that the third restamping would 
be closed at the end of 1703, an arrêt du Conseil (2 December 1703) ordered the redemption 
of all the mint bills. The small denominations up to 150 livres were to be repaid as a matter 
of urgency and were in effect redeemed. The holders of larger notes were offered the 
alternative of immediate repayment or 8 per cent interest if they converted their bills to 
promissory notes of the tax farmers (indirect tax) or the general receivers (direct tax), payable 
either in April or July 1704. With the exception of a few individuals who asked special 
permission to hold on to their mint bills, the outstanding bills were all redeemed.  
If Chamillart ever received praise for his financial policy, it was on 17 January 1704 when a 
sieur Du Breuil wrote to him that:  
‘the last two declarations you have published on the mint bills have absolutely re-
established confidence [crédit]. That is no paltry service you have rendered to the 
state, Sir, because trade on the part of merchant bankers was entirely ruined. We see 
by these acts the superiority of your genius and everyone knows that this is your 
work.’  
The letter added, however,  
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‘But were it possible, Sir, to stop these increases and decreases of the coins with which 
the public are threatened each month, it would be one of the most important services 
than one could render to the state because, Sir, that is the cause of infinite disorders 
in the kingdom through the suspension of trade in all the provinces […] it would be a 
hundred times better to resort to any other means, whatever it might be, than to use 
this one to procure some profit to the king.’11  
III 
Du Breuil certainly misread Chamillart’s intentions. Only a few months elapsed before the 
minister ordered the fourth and last restamping of Louis XIV’s reign. Uncharacteristically, the 
decision was not made public in the autumn but in May and enforced from 1 June 1704. 
Chamillart’s early move probably reflected problems in gathering funds for the new military 
campaign. In the course of 1703, the difficulties of the CdE and the rising volume of mint bills 
reflected a worsening of the fiscal situation. By now, payments to financiers and bankers were 
severely delayed as the sale of royal offices and annuities dragged on. Among them, Samuel 
Bernard had advanced no less than 20 million on behalf of the government. He regularly urged 
Chamillart to maintain a flow of cash in his direction to sustain the complex traffic of bills of 
exchange upon which he and his correspondents across Europe relied to borrow and remit 
money to French troops. As Rowlands (2012) rightly argued, at this point the system of 
assignations on the revenue from affaires extraordinaires was dysfunctional, but measures 
had already been implemented to address this issue12.  
Difficulties were partly a consequence of the shortage of money in France. In this respect, the 
failure of the fourth restamping transformed a very difficult situation into a nightmare. As 
table 2 shows, over two years (1704-06) the French mints received only 175 million lt. worth 
of coins to restamp, barely half the coins brought during the 1701 operation on the coinage 
(321.5 million), which itself was already down by about a third on the restampings of 1689 
and 1693. As a result, between 1704 and 1709 France waged war with a stock of legal coins 
at its lowest ever level. Overall, the distribution of coins among the different mints did not 
change significantly. The four major mints - Paris, Lyon, Rennes and Rouen – still received 
between 54 and 60 per cent of the old coins restamped in the kingdom. Yet in volume the 
money crunch was dramatic. The Paris mint had worked 170 and 140 million lt. worth of coins 
in the course of Pontchartrain’s two restampings as against 103 (1701) and 65 million (1704) 
under Chamillart. It is hardly a surprise, then, that bankers and financiers were complaining 
about the scarcity of money and the rising interest rate.  
Place table 1 about here 
Since all the mints experienced a formidable drop in the coins brought for restamping 
(between 30 and 74 per cent), the money crunch probably had common causes. Traditionally, 
the authorities blamed money shortages on the export of coins. In a memorandum written to 
Marlborough, Huguetan explained that the failure of the 1704 restamping resulted from the 
accumulated dispatch of coins to Bourbon troops abroad, which he estimated at 70 million lt. 
per year, of which half (32 million) were destined for Italy.13 This analysis – if not the figures - 
is partly confirmed by observations from Chamillart and Desmaretz on letters and 
memoranda they received. About the shortage in Lyon, both men agreed that considerable 
sums had been shipped to Italy, and this despite contracts with Genevan bankers stipulating 
that remittances should only be effected  done by bills of exchange (Lüthy 1959). But the 
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disruption of war, the impact of debasements on foreign exchange rate and emergency 
situations meant that shipping money out of the country was, at times, the cheapest, fastest 
or even only solution available.14 As was also the case for British remitters to Germany and 
Spain [Graham (2015)], French bankers struggled when they could not map out their 
operations on the basis of established trade networks.  
But other causes contributed to the monetary difficulties of Lyon, where the mint under 
Pontchartrain had restamped as much as 10 per cent of the French money stock, a share now 
halved to 5 per cent. Part of the problem was interruption of the silver supply (Morineau 
1985). During the Nine Years Wars the city’s merchants and bankers, and the manufacture of 
clothes embroidered with silver, had relied on Spanish metal shipped via Barcelona-Genoa-
Marseilles (Courdurié 1981). After the death of Charles II of Spain this route was suddenly 
shut. In Lyon the 1701 restamping brought only 17.4 million worth of coins as against 42 and 
48 million previously. In this respect, the defection of Savoy, although a minor state, was a 
great setback to the French military and financial operations (Storrs 2008). Also, in 1704, 
England and Holland agreed to coordinate their economic policy and prohibit trade with 
France, which affected the cost of remittances. At the same time, the benefits of the recent 
union of the French and Spanish thrones under the Bourbon dynasty were hampered by 
domestic divisions and conflicting national interests (Lévy 1969, Dubet 2009).  
These problems were not the sole reasons for France’s monetary difficulties. In a monarchy 
where the king enjoyed absolute power and the right to fix the value of coins, few dared break 
a taboo and write, like Desmaretz did in 1703, that ‘all these causes cannot have produced 
the disappearance of all the coins which have not made their way to the mints in the third 
restamping. It is highly likely that a substantial portion of the coins, and perhaps the largest, 
stayed in the pockets and safes of individuals’.15 This is also Dessert’s assumption (1984). One 
way or another, the king’s subjects, in particular the wealthy, evaded the impact of royal 
policy. The apparent confusion of the legislation, which retracted, postponed or altered 
monetary decisions, was probably less a reflection of inconsistency in Versailles’ approach 
than of ad hoc adjustments to the public responses and, of course, the impact of military 
campaigns on confidence.  
Estimating the volume of coins exported and hoarded is problematical. The success of 
Desmaretz’s recoinage in 1709 is an indication that observers did not exaggerate when they 
argued that there was still plenty of money in France. In the course of 18 months, between 
May 1709 and December 1710, the mints delivered coins worth twice the sums brought in 
1704. Lyon’s mint hit an all-time record with 49 million. The trading opportunities with the 
Spanish empire were starting to pay off as French merchants and privateers now had a firm 
grip on the South Sea trade. Further to agreements with Madrid concerning the payment of 
the Spanish king’s tax on specie imports (indult), cargoes full of Peruvian silver - a trade which 
took on average 18 months - were now authorized to return directly to Atlantic French 
harbours, like Saint-Malo, and even to Marseilles on the Mediterranean Sea (Dahlgren 1909; 
Lespagnol 1996). Yet it is difficult to believe that the increase in the volume of coins produced 
in 1709 over 1704, worth 200 million lt., and weighing about 15,000 tons, suddenly arrived 
from South America or were imported back into France from abroad. As we will see, 
Bernholtz’s analytical model of inflation provides a smart solution to the flows of money to 
the mints.  
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In the meantime, the failure of Chamillart’s two restampings had considerable impact. 
According to Huguetan, the interest on money rose to 25 per cent in July 1704. On 6 August, 
Bernard wrote an alarming letter to Chamillart saying that ‘affairs become difficult to a point 
that it is impossible to express; it is not possible to receive [any shilling] from the best payers; 
it is not possible to find [one pence] at any price, nor any occasion to get any credit’. Seeking 
a remedy, Bernard declared: ‘I don’t know any other than to make the mint bills legal tender, 
in one way or another’.16 The CdE was a collateral victim of the money crunch. In May the 
balance sheets were once again negative. In August, news of the French rout at Blenheim 
caused a financial run. Guiguou, the treasurer in charge of the CdE, informed Chamillart that 
he had only 20 to 25,000 écus left (ca. 80.000 lt.) and could not carry on paying as his colleague 
Bartet, who held the caisse des fermes, refused to support him any longer 17 . On 13 
September, Chamillart informed Desmaretz about the ‘furious rate at which money is 
withdrawn from the caisse des emprunts; it is too much to be overwhelmed from so many 
different quarters; I beg you, that you, with Mr Poulletier, find 200 or 300,000 francs for this 
caisse. There is not a moment to lose for that purpose’.18 But money was nowhere to be 
found. An arrêt du Conseil suspended payments from 17 September 1704 until 1 April 1705.19  
A solution to the crisis was elaborated in consultation with the key actors. In December, 
Chamillart had a meeting with the main bankers to whom he disclosed crucial information 
about the financial situation of the crown. Three steps were taken to restore confidence. First, 
income from a 10 per cent increase of all indirect taxes collected by the tax farmers was 
assigned to the CdE; second, to dissuade lenders from requesting payment of their promesses, 
the interest was increased by 2 points to 10 per cent; third, Euldes was to issue new mint bills 
that would be legal tender, permitted to circulate only in Paris, and to which would be 
attached a 7.5 per cent interest. As promised by the government, the CdE resumed its 
payments on 1 April 1705. For two months confidence remained low: in April and May 
payments out of the CdE exceeded its revenue by 4.6 million and 1.4 million respectively. 
What mattered, however, was that owners of promesses accepted to be paid their capital 
partly in cash and partly in the new mint bills. The main bankers and financiers certainly 
played a crucial role in helping restore confidence in the CdE by circulating the new bills. 
Although the CdE’s monthly surpluses were not brilliant, by the start of 1706 its situation had 
improved significantly. While Rowlands is deeply critical of the whole experience, the second 
issue of mint bills, which built upon the previous one, was a complete success. It overcame 
the liquidity crisis of 1704 and saved the CdE. It helped turn the page over Louis XIV’s bitter 
defeat in Bavaria by funding the largest military deployment since the beginning of the war.  
Place figure 3 about here 
IV 
It is not possible here to analyse in much detail the history of the second issue of mint bills, 
from their initial appearance in 1704, to their progressive conversion between 1707 and 1709, 
and their final demonetisation in 1712. Figure 3, which plots data about the market value of 
mint bills against coins at different dates, shows that the whole experience can be divided 
into three main phases. As John Law was only too keen to acknowledge later, in the first 
eighteen months of their existence the successful introduction of the new bills confirmed that 
paper money was a workable solution to overcome the economic and financial evils caused 
by specie shortages in wartime. ‘This is evidenced’, commented Law, ‘by the success of mint 
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bills. This project… has been received for some time in trade on the same footing as coins’ 
(Harsin 1934, II, pp. 18-19). The new bills were such a success that destroying their credit 
became Huguetan’s obsession after he defected to the Allies in 1705. Bernard’s former 
associate managed to convince Marlborough that he should attack the new monetary 
instrument by renewing prohibitions on Dutch merchants and bankers who traded with 
France in bills of exchange and, worse, according to Huguetan, in mint bills.  
Initially, the parity between the coin and paper currencies was banded, and this thanks to 
Chamillart’s orders to the traitants that their cashiers in Paris buy mint bills with the revenue 
from affaires extraordinaires. Although our figures indicate an 8 per cent loss of paper money 
against coins as early as July 1705, a contract signed in November between Chamillart and 
the Hogguer brothers for remitting money in the 1706 campaign indicates that leading 
financiers regarded mint bills as equivalent to coins. But even at a loss of 8 per cent against 
specie, the new monetary instrument was a relatively cheap method of funding the war 
deficit. Against Versailles’ expectations, however, the 1706 campaign was a complete disaster 
which increased financial difficulties. For instance, the failure to capture Turin and neutralise 
Italy suddenly opened the south of France to foreign invasion, thus drying out a line of credit 
from Italian bankers whose operations were backed by the nearby états provinciaux of 
Languedoc, i.e. provincial tax institutions. Between August and November 1706, the premium 
of coins over mint bills rose from 20 to 60 per cent. Among the victims were the Hogguers 
who had to abandon remittances (Lüthy 1959). A spate of royal orders was meant to reduce 
the growing gap between specie and paper, including the appointment of Desmaretz in 
February 1708, the effect of which is noticeable in table 4 below, but they failed to reverse 
the trend.  
Place table 4 about here 
Although inflation and defeat suffice to explain the mounting criticisms of Chamillart, primary 
sources show that he had a solid grasp of the problems and was able to make independent 
judgements. Whether or not their grateful letters to Chamillart are to be read as expressions 
of polite deference for a minister who held the highest responsibilities ever bestowed by Louis 
XIV on one person, the bankers he invited to his residence to discuss again with him the 
problem of paper money had only praise for his deep understanding of money matters. True, 
Chamillart failed to find a satisfactory solution to a monetary experience which got out of 
hand. But this was an extraordinary situation: no country had ever experienced the effects of 
the sustained injection of paper money. Given the military and fiscal constraints, neither the 
technocrats nor the wider merchant community were able to offer accurate, clear or 
workable proposals for tackling inflation. Desmaretz himself, certainly one of the best experts, 
acknowledged the challenge. In a major report where he summarised the proposals sent to 
the government, Chamillart’s advisor admitted in May 1706 that the mint bills had become 
‘the most difficult financial matter that has ever presented itself’.20  
Chamillart, who read and, on more than one occasion, annotated the projects he solicited 
and received, was well aware of the three main causes of depreciation. Too many mint bills 
had been issued with limited collateral. On 1 December 1705, the profit on the fourth 
restamping was 9.2 million as against 83.6 million lt. of outstanding mint bills. At the end of 
1706 some 180 million lt. worth of mint bills circulated in Paris, a sum equivalent to the costs 
of one military campaign. By contrast with England, where each issue of exchequer bills was 
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fixed by Parliament (Dickson 1967; Kleer 2015), the number of French mint bills printed and 
distributed was unknown. Inevitably, lack of trustworthy information fuelled rumours and 
eroded confidence. The initial success of the mint bills owed a lot to restoring trust within the 
financial community. For instance, in the summer of 1704, at the height of the credit crunch, 
Bernard had bluntly refused to honour a bill of exchange drawn on him and presented for 
payment by the tax farmers’ cashier because the latter had refused to accept a payment by 
compensation, i.e. in deduction of a note Bernard owned on him 21 . In this context, the 
introduction of new monetary instruments backed by a new restamping, and combined with 
a 10 % tax increase, had been regarded as the only quick fix to the liquidity crisis.  
By 1706, such adjustments were insufficient to sustain the mass of paper money. As figure 5 
shows, the general treasurers of the army, the bankers in charge of remittances and the 
military suppliers were the main recipients of mint bills. The new credit facility had its limits, 
though, because the financiers could not operate with paper money only. In particular, every 
three months they needed to gather large amounts of cash to settle their accounts with their 
correspondents and creditors at the Lyon fairs (Sayous 1938; Lüthy 1959; Lévy 1969; 
Rowlands 2012 and 2014). In need of specie, financiers and bankers had to sell bills for coins. 
The more mint bills they cashed the more widely these bills circulated in Paris, the only place 
where they were allowed as payments.  
Place figure 5 about here 
Inevitably a secondary market blossomed. Indeed, there was a demand for bills. Since they 
were legal tender, the notes could be used by creditors to pay off their debts or to apply the 
threat of a repayment in depreciated bills to obtain better conditions from their lenders22. 
People who had trials pending before a court could also use mint bills when asked to give a 
deposit (consignation). In this respect, not unlike John Law’s System, the experience of the 
mint bills may have had some positive impact on activity (Faure 1977; Jambu 2013). This said, 
Chamillart and Desmaretz, like most of their successors in the 18th century, were reluctant to 
let the private market determine the price of bills. They loathed the brokers and a new group 
of individuals, the so-called agioteurs (jobbers), whom they blamed for the depreciation of 
paper money. In the spring of 1706, Chamillart imprisoned several jobbers in the Bastille. As 
rumours about speculation developed, he warned prominent financiers of terrible penalties 
if he learnt that they engaged in trafficking. 23  But severity only contributed to the 
depreciation of bills against specie. 
As Desmaretz admitted in the May report he wrote for Chamillart, the outright suppression 
of bills was not a viable solution because they remained a useful and necessary resource to 
fund the war deficit.24 The key question was to decide whether the advantages of the bills 
were worth their costs. Arguably, the answer was both technical and political. In collaboration 
with the best experts, Chamillart explored various ways of fighting depreciation by reducing 
the number, widening the circulation and improving the liquidity of mint bills. At the start of 
1706 a royal declaration had already tried to restore confidence by stating the king’s 
commitment to redeeming the bills after the war. But bad news from the front constantly 
destroyed hopes of a foreseeable peace. In June of the same year it was announced that no 
more notes were to be issued. In September, a policy of absorption by conversion was 
devised. As in 1703, the mint bills could be exchanged for promissory bills of the tax farmers 
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(25 million lt.) and the receivers general (25 million lt.), or used to purchase new issues of 
royal loans (18 million lt.).  
Illiquidity was another cause of the depreciation of mint bills. In particular, they could not be 
employed for paying taxes. Many contemporaries complained about a legal tender which the 
king rejected for himself. The reasons for this apparent contradiction were twofold. The idea 
of allowing payment of taxes in bills looked like opening Pandora’s box. It would jeopardise 
cash payment of the interests on perpetual bonds which constituted a substantial portion of 
the revenue of many families in Paris, in particular the elite of office-holders. In other words, 
it could be the spark of a revolt in Paris, as in the Fronde of 1648. The government also feared 
that tax receivers would hoard cash and send notes to the Treasury, as happened in England 
in the third issue of exchequer bills with the help of the London goldsmiths (Kleer 2015). If 
the Bank of England, in tandem with the Treasury, was capable of exerting pressure on fiscal 
agents, France lacked a central institution to monitor the activities of the receveurs généraux 
des finances and those receivers who, under them, collected direct taxes across the kingdom. 
This problem became acute only after Chamillart, further to an important meeting with 
bankers, ordered in May 1707 that all payments would be made with a portion of bills and 
throughout the kingdom. The responses from the provincial authorities and the merchants 
were so unanimously hostile that not only was the decision postponed until the end of that 
year but also probably cost Chamillart his post as finance minister. As the crisis unfolded, 
Chamillart became restless and authoritarian. In September 1707, he wrote a fiscal report for 
the king and asked for full powers, in particular in the area of economic policy where he had 
constantly been thwarted by Pontchartrain and his son.25  
As shown in figure 4, all these measures certainly helped fight inflation. But the monarchy 
was so short of cash that concessions were governed by urgent needs and, as a result, they 
were often double-edged. For instance, the benefits of conversion into other assets were 
cancelled by the suppression of the interests paid on the outstanding mint bills. Meanwhile, 
the costs of remitting money abroad snowballed. The service of the bankers who contracted 
remittances became unsustainable. On top of the losses resulting from the debasement of 
the livre tournois, they had to charge the king for the costs of selling mint bills for coins. 
Moreover, as the royal treasury did not pay them in advance, bankers had to charge interest 
for securing loans on the international money market, to which were added the commissions 
of intermediaries. In addition, news from the battlefield continued to play a crucial role. As 
far as public confidence was concerned, the fall of Lille (1708) wiped out the benefits of 
Desmaretz’s appointment. As with the Hogguers in 1706, the depreciation of the mint bills 
threatened Samuel Bernard’s capacity to continue borrowing on the international market. In 
Spring 1708, at the Lyon fair, he was unable to reach an agreement with his principal creditors, 
a dire situation which unleashed the second major financial crisis of the war (Lüthy 1959, Lévy 
1969, Rowlands 2012, 2014).  
A last attempt was made to preserve the principle of paper money without suffering its side 
effects, and this through the establishment of a bank. Several projects were submitted to the 
new minister. They all aimed to reduce the volume of mint bills or consolidate them into other 
assets. At the start of 1709, a Bernard’s bank proposal was agreed by the king but almost 
immediately abandoned by Desmaretz. The alleged failure of one of Bernard’s partners to 
gather his share of the capital of the bank was probably less relevant than a staunch 
opposition, in particular from the royal intendant in Lyon, which shook Desmaretz’s trust in 
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the scheme (Boislisle 1874-1897, III, pp. 646-651; Harsin 1933). As Rowlands contends, it was 
probably not workable. Desmaretz decided that the suppression of the mint bills was the only 
viable option. To this effect, a fifth and last debasement was ordered by the king in May 1709. 
This time the operation was performed by means of a full recoinage. To obtain new minted 
coins, the king’s subjects were required, as usual, to bring their old coins to the mint but also 
mint bills amounting to one sixth of the value of their coins.  
Despite the Paris Parlement’s astute observations that the substantial increase in the value 
of the coins and the total loss of the mint bills would be extremely costly to the king’s subjects, 
the operation went ahead. Supported by the arrival in Saint-Malo of ships carrying 30 million 
worth of silver which Desmaretz managed to borrow, the 1709 recoinage was relatively 
effective, especially given the dire context of the Great Winter. Bernholtz’s analytical model 
explains the apparent contradiction of people now bringing to the mints their money and bills, 
as would happen again in 1718, despite the clear loss. Whereas, in the first stage of 
Chamillart’s policy of debasement, the co-existence of two currencies of different nominal 
value had set in motion Gresham’s law, which was further reinforced by the introduction of 
mint bills, in the second stage paper money inflation had reduced the value of mint bills to 
the point that Thiers’ law applied and people were keen to bring in their hoarded coins 
[Berholtz (2003, p. 132)]. In effect, after years of war and in the context of money shortages, 
many of the king subjects badly needed specie as the bills had lost most of their value.  
Desmaretz’s operation, though, was only half a success: out of the 72 million lt. of mint bills 
still in circulation only 37 million were absorbed in the recoinage. New opportunities for 
converting the remaining mint bills into promissory bills or capital of loans had to be offered, 
until their demonetisation in 171226. Meanwhile, Desmaretz tried to persuade the hoarders 
of old coins to bring their savings to the mints, in particular by offering a better price and 
removing the need to include mint bills. He also attracted silver piasters to France by offering 
a higher price to specie (surachat). Thanks to these measures, the legal stock of money was 
reconstituted to its pre-war level in 1715. Yet, considered as a process, the recoinage was 
unable to put an end to the credit crunch, war deficit and inflation overnight. In fact, while 
Desmaretz suppressed the mint bills on the one hand he drew heavily on the CdE on the other 
hand. The promesses des gabelles issued rose from 44 to 140 million between 1707 and 1714, 
a level close to Chamillart’s mint bills. At the end of the war, the CdE institution was on the 
brink of collapse. So too was Desmaretz’s Caisse Legendre (1710) which issued receivers 
general’s bills, or anticipations of future tax revenue. As with the mint bills, managing this 
growing volume of monetary instruments became harder and costlier for lack of adequate 
collateral. Desmaretz’s introduction of a new universal tax on wealth, the dixième (1710), was 
a very courageous move but it came too late and its product was disappointing (Bonney 1993; 
McCollim 2012). Like the mint bills, payment of the interest on promesses had to be 
postponed in 1710, and capital repayment could only be met by secret new and larger issues 
which were discounted by bankers and financiers at great loss. At Louis XIV’s death, in 1715, 
inflation had reached new highs: the short-term debt in bonds and other monetary 
instruments was over 800 million, a sum broadly equivalent to the costs of four military 
campaigns (Desmaretz 1715). One might argue, therefore, that Desmaretz, whose 
administration has been praised by historians, did not do much better than Chamillart. This is 
hardly a surprise: after all, they worked hand in hand until the political pressures of military 
and fiscal crises parted them.  
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V 
An anonymous, able and hostile commentator on the experience of mint bills (and banks in 
general) summarized the whole monetary experience with a riddle: ‘the politician would say 
to the financier that without the help of these bills we could not have started nor continued 
the enterprises we have undertaken, and the financier would ask if it would not have been 
better to wish not to have started them, since it is not possible to sustain them any longer’.27 
In many respects, our article confirms this analysis. Mint bills made it possible for France to 
pursue the war effort but, at the same time, they created new problems. In marked contrast 
to John Law’s contention that the mint bills’ chance of success depended on the proper 
management of a necessary resource, the anonymous observer insisted on the 
incompatibility between absolute power and paper money. In one case the failure is 
attributed to institutions; in the other, it points to individual responsibility, in particular, as 
Rowlands argued, the personal limitations of Chamillart.  
Our own analysis shows that Chamillart, regardless of his lack of success in the realm of 
finance and his misfortunes on the battlefield, was not as helpless a figure as his poor 
reputation would suggest (Pénicaut 2004). Our anonymous commentator, who scathingly 
wrote that only Louis XIV failed to see how stupid Chamillart was, would have been surprised 
if he had seen a letter from the minister to the king dated 16 October 1706. In this letter, 
written six months after the French defeat at Ramillies, and while he was preparing the next 
campaign, Chamillart reminded the king that he had advised him in 1703, on the grounds of 
financial exhaustion, to make peace at the expense of Spain; and that after Blenheim he had 
proposed the ‘introduction of the mint bills, not as a great relief, but as a necessary evil’. 
Chamillart added:  
‘I took the liberty to tell Your Majesty that [the evil] would become irremediable if the 
war forced [us] to make such a great number that the paper would take over the 
money. What I predicted has happened, the disorder they have produced is extreme; 
far from considering them as a new means of getting more help, one must necessarily 
think of reducing it at a time when there is a dearth of resources on all sides’. 28 
This letter gives rise to an array of questions about the nature of power in the absolute 
monarchy, a matter of lively academic discussion, and the making of royal policy under Louis 
XIV. On paper, Chamillart was the most powerful Bourbon minister ever; in practice, it 
appears that neither his personal advice about the war nor his warnings about abusing the 
facility of mint bills were seriously listened to. To resolve this apparent paradox and account 
for the difficulties encountered during Louis XIV’s last wars, historians have recently argued 
that the ministers appointed later in his reign were not as able as Colbert and Louvois, their 
illustrious predecessors (Sarmant & Stoll 2010; Stoll 2011). In the light of recent research on 
the early modern state in France (Collins 2009) or military strategy and the old problem of 
cabinet policy (Cénat 2010), it seems that more investigation needs to be undertaken 
concerning the formation of French fiscal policy and decision-making under Louis XIV, paying 
attention to the internal dynamics of the Conseil du Roi, the king’s entourage, and the various 
pressure groups in Versailles.  
Louis XIV’s political decision to pursue war was the main reason for the introduction of mint 
bills. The initial success of this paper money partially validates the mismanagement thesis 
advanced by John Law and Guy Rowlands. But at the same time Law’s own failed experience 
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shows that printing money (and devaluating currency) was much easier than managing the 
inflationary bias of political systems. As a matter of fact, the men in charge of finance tried 
their best and sought the help of the financing and banking community to make the most of 
Chamillart’s first experiment with paper money. But maintaining confidence in paper against 
specie was a thankless task in the face of recurrent military defeats, given the absence of 
constraints on the power to print notes according to needs, and the lack of robust collateral 
in the form of adequate fiscal revenue and an affordable credit system. For the anonymous 
commentator, the true power of a king rested on his sovereign right to tax his subjects and 
not on determining the value of paper money which depended on public trust. Paradoxically, 
as Bayard (1988) and Dessert (1984) have demonstrated, the Bourbon kings preferred not to 
tax their elites and used other methods to tap the wealth of their subjects, in particular 
through exploitation of privilege. This contradiction in the relationship between the king, the 
privileged elites and the rest of his subjects remained at the heart of Old Regime France, and 
is rightly considered a major structural weakness and a cause of the ultimate collapse of the 
absolute monarchy. Yet it is questionable whether any ruler or polity would have embarked 
upon war without a sense of their own strengths or had they known that the conflict would 
drag on for a decade or more. Louis XIV’s thirst for glory, his personal authority and the sheer 
size of his kingdom meant that he was able to pursue war, fatigue and divide his enemies, 
avoid financial meltdown, escape ultimate defeat and, even, win Spain and its colonial empire 
for his dynasty. To be sure, he left a heavily burdened kingdom to his successor, but one which 
had the potential to reap the benefits of the Spanish Succession. For better or worse, that is 
another story.   
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